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| Contingencies and Metacontingencies in Experimental Microsocieties |
| Sunday, May 25, 2008 |
| 9:00 AM–10:20 AM |
| 4A |
| Area: TPC; Domain: Basic Research |
| Chair: Sigrid S. Glenn (University of North Texas) |
| Abstract: The concept of metacontingency is designed to 1) convey the hierarchical nature of contingencies of selection at behavioral and cultural levels of organization, 2) account for the evolution of cultural complexity over extended time, and 3) take us a step toward a unified theory for life sciences. The causal status of metacontingencies has been suggested to be the same as the causal status of operant contingencies. Although people working to bring about change in cultural level systems have found the metacontingency concept to be useful (e.g. Biglan, 2007; Malott, 2003), experimental analysis is needed. This symposium reports 3 experiments designed to experimentally manipulate metacontingencies in microsocieties and to examine the evolution of the interlocking behavioral contingencies that stabilize as a function of the metacontingencies. |
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| Taking the Metacontingency Concept to the Experimental Laboratory. |
| SIGRID S. GLENN (University of North Texas) |
| Abstract: The concept of metacontingency is designed to 1) convey the hierarchical nature of contingencies of selection at behavioral and cultural levels of organization, 2) account for the evolution of cultural complexity over extended time, and 3) take us a step toward a unified theory for life sciences. The causal status of metacontingencies has been suggested to be the same as the causal status of operant contingencies. In this paper, the operant preparation is presented as a model for experimental analysis of metacontingencies. |
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| Effect of Contingent Outcomes and Changes in Group Membership on Distribution of Group Earnings in an Experimental Metacontingency. |
| RICARDO CORREA MARTONE (Universidade de Brasília and Instituto de Educação), Thomas Anatol Da Rocha Woelz (University of North Texas) |
| Abstract: This experiment was designed to model the functional relations described by the metacontingency concept. In a game-like setting involving 3 players, participants first contributed individually to a group total, then chose by consensus a row on a matrix. Their consensual choice resulted in profit or loss on their investment. Then participants chose by consensus how to distribute the net earnings among themselves (aggregate product). The result of their row choice (profit or loss) was manipulated by the experimenter and was based on whether they had distributed group earnings equally or unequally in the previous cycle. The experimental arrangement was designed to mask the relation between earnings distributions and subsequent earnings. Equal and unequal distributions were required in alternating conditions (A-B-A or B-A-B). In each condition, one player was replaced by a novice player after IBCs resulted in a stable product over several consecutive cycles. The results suggested that the metacontingency between the product of the IBC’s and the subsequent payoff functioned to produce IBC’s that generate the selected product. |
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| An Iterated n-players Prisoner's Dilemma Game with an External Selecting Agent: A Metacontingency Experiment |
| DANIELE ORTU (University of North Texas), Thomas Anatol Da Rocha Woelz (University of North Texas) |
| Abstract: Previous research on Prisoner’s Dilemma Game suggests that two players learn to maximize individual earnings by cooperating rather than defecting, but increasing the number of players makes cooperation increasingly unlikely (Rachlin 2004). A modified version of the Iterated n-players Prisoner's Dilemma Game (INPDG) was used here to analyze how an external selecting agent can determine the formation of stable patterns of cooperation or defection. Between 2 and 5 players in a game were told that they were owners of a company. Each player, facing the screen of a personal computer, chose to defect or cooperate in each cycle. Feedback relative to profit and loss of the company was given to all players. Company profits and losses were added to individual gains from cooperating and defecting. Company profits and losses were manipulated by the experimenter to control the level of cooperation/defection and feedback was given on a VR2-cycle schedule (metacontingency arrangement). An A-B-A design was used to assess the effect of the metacontingency on changes in cooperation vs. defection among players. The results suggest that the level of cooperation is influenced by the market. |
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| Effect of Resource Availability on Recurring Interlocking Behavioral Contingencies and Their Aggregate Products. |
| ANA BARBARA NEVES (University of North Texas), Thomas Anatol Da Rocha Woelz (University of North Texas) |
| Abstract: College students participating in dyads played a game designed as an analog of early hunters whose survival, as a dyad and ultimately individually, depends on rabbits they hunt. A previous preparation manipulated level of resource scarcity in two ways - probability of returning from the hunt with no rabbits and magnitude of returns when rabbits were obtained. The effects of scarcity on interlocking behavioral contingencies (IBCs) and their aggregate products were examined. Interlocking behavioral contingencies are defined as sharing resources with another participant and the aggregate product is defined as collective fitness (both participants able to advance to the next hunting cycle). Results suggested IBCs were more sensitive to probability of returns than to the magnitude variable. The present study manipulated probability of returns, increasing the difference in probabilities across conditions. Additional changes included increasing the number of repetitions of conditions and increasing the number of cycles per condition. Results show a clearer effect of scarcity on the sharing of rabbits and on collective fitness. Examination of the behavior of individual participants in the dyad revealed different levels of sharing. |
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