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| International Paper Session - Behaviorism and Philosophy |
| Saturday, May 26, 2007 |
| 4:00 PM–4:50 PM |
| Cunningham B |
| Area: TPC |
| Chair: Francois Tonneau (Universidad de Guadalajara, Mexico) |
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| Behaviorism and the Intentional Stance. |
| Domain: Theory |
| FRANCOIS TONNEAU (Universidad de Guadalajara, Mexico) |
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| Abstract: The distinguishing feature of intentional explanations of behavior is that they rely on beliefs and desires. Starting with the classic objections of Geach and Chisholm to Rylean behaviorism, philosophers have offered powerful arguments in favor of the non-eliminability of intentional language. Yet, most behaviorists have paid little attention to these philosophical challenges and have underestimated the power of the accompanying arguments. In this talk, I review the arguments in favor of the intentional stance, and, drawing on the pioneering work of Boyer and others, I suggest possible answers to the intentional challenge. |
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| Common Grounds: Nietzsche’s Philosophy, Natural Sciences and Radical Behaviorism. |
| Domain: Theory |
| ROGER VILARDAGA (University of Nevada, Reno) |
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| Abstract: Frederick Nietzsche’s writings have been widely influential and extensively interpreted; his philosophy has been almost exclusively seen through the lenses of humanistic and philosophical disciplines and usually taken to support controversial worldviews. In this paper, it is not our intent to provide the “right” version of this philosopher’s thinking, but rather, to explore some connections that might be relevant from a Radical Behavioral viewpoint. Our purpose then, is twofold: first, we will explore the connections of his philosophy with the materialistic and pragmatic assumptions of the natural sciences, and second, we will present some of his considerations regarding the attribution of causality for private events and its compatibility with Behavioral analytical thinking. Clinical implications are commented. |
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